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Introduction 
Village surveys have long offered a window through which to closely examine production 
conditions in Indian agriculture. There is a large literature which has analysed the nature of 
agricultural production in developing countries, a large part of which has been in the Indian 
context.  Within this literature, the institution of sharecropping has received a great deal of 
attention.  It is increasingly recognised that in order to understand the purpose and role of this 
institution one needs to understand as well the nature of inter-linkages1 between markets for, 
and choices concerning, factors of production, especially in light of the fact that markets are 
often imperfect and risk is important.. Various explanations for the existence of 
sharecropping have been put forward.  Most of these are built on neo-classical assumptions of 
complete and well-functioning markets.  These explanations have generally failed to receive 
widespread acceptance as it is generally acknowledged that reality is generally far more 
complex than the assumptions of neo-classical economics would allow.  After all, if markets 
functioned perfectly they would achieve all that is needed for efficiency and as a result, 
sharecropping would be redundant.   The reality is that many markets are absent; many are 
imperfect and some factors of production indivisible. Share tenancy may represent an 
institutional response to such missing markets, thereby providing a more efficient outcome 
than what is possible without such institutions; full efficiency is unlikely to be achievable in 
such a context.  
 One of the early writers to suggest that share cropping might lead to an inefficient 
outcome was Marshall. The notion of Marshallian inefficiency arises from the fact that in 
share cropping, labour application by the tenant is a fraction of the maximum that would 
equate his marginal product of labour with to its opportunity cost. That is, if the tenant 
chooses his labour allocation there is no incentive for the tenant to apply labour to the most 
efficient level but rather to only apply his labour to the point where his returns are equal to 
the opportunity cost of his labour2. Cheung (1969) proposed that the existence of 
sharecropping is a result of a combination of high transaction costs and the benefit of risk-
sharing that sharecropping entails. These together determine whether fixed-rent tenancy 
would be dominant, or sharecropping. In his model, Cheung assumed that the landlord is in a 
position to observe the efforts of the tenant and can enforce the terms of the contract in an 
inexpensive and effective way. He then proved that in the absence of risk and transaction 
costs required to enforce the contract, the presence of many landlords and tenants would 
bring in an element of competition and consequently, the share rent and the labour allocation 
which follow from sharecropping would be the same as in the case of fixed rent tenancy. In 
other words, under these assumptions, the sharecropped land would be cultivated in the same 
                                                           
1
 By inter-linkages, we mean transactions in different markets (e.g. labour, land and credit), taking place at the 
same time and in a linked way, between related, or the same individual agents.  
2
 Marshall, wisely as ever, noted that in this context the landowner would wish to press for or insist on labour 
application and practices.  
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way as owned or rented on fixed rent, and therefore, sharecropping would be an efficient 
system. 
 Comparison between a family’s average inputs and yield on own land versus that on 
sharecropped land has been used in many empirical studies to test the efficiency of 
sharecropping. The results have been mixed. Shaban (1987) conducted an empirical study on 
eight ICRISAT villages and rejected the monitoring approach of Cheung in modelling share 
tenancy. In a similar study, Bliss and Stern (1982) could find no significant evidence to 
suggest that in Palanpur tenancy makes any difference to the level of output per acre or the 
level of inputs between owned and sharecropped land.  
 A second type of explanation for different tenurial contracts is based on asymmetry of 
information between the landlord and the tenant regarding the tenant’s abilities. This 
approach was originally developed by Hallagan (1978) and Newbery-Stiglitz (1979). In their 
framework, it is argued that tenants of different ability self-select into different contracts 
available.   Sharecropping plays a role in matching the most productive tenant with the most 
productive contract. In particular tenants with high ability choose a fixed-rent contract despite 
a high rent stipulated by the landlord, because they get the returns to their productivity. This 
approach has been criticised on many counts and the strongest criticism is that in villages, 
people know each other quite well and it is hard to believe that the abilities of prospective 
tenants are unknown. Even if the abilities are unknown at some point of time, once the 
tenants self-select, their abilities will be revealed and the asymmetric information cannot 
persist over time. As a result, sharecropping can only be a temporary feature and a continuous 
influx of new tenants is needed for the institution to continue to exist.   In practice, 
sharecropping has been seen to persist over long periods of time, also in environments 
characterized low turnover of tenants.  This casts some doubt on this line of argument.  
 Another approach to tenancy theory, which can be seen in the works of Bell and 
Zusman (1979), Pant (1983), Bliss and Stern (1982) among many others, focuses on market 
imperfections beyond simply the land market to explain the emergence of tenancy. Bliss and 
Stern (1982) found that in Palanpur the bullock market and the market for family labour were 
highly imperfect. A farmer will generally be unwilling to rent out his bullock for fear that it 
would be mistreated, and at the same time be loath to plough another farmer’s field because 
of the demeaning “labourer” status this would impart. Being a “labourer” in Palanpur is 
associated with membership of a low social status, low income group which is unlikely to 
own valuable assets such as bullocks.  Labourers will thus be unable to provide the ploughing 
services required for successful cultivation. In order to use the services of these two markets, 
the landlord has to make the owners of these factors residual claimants; hence, a role for 
tenancy. These arguments are in addition to important element of risk sharing, provided by 
share tenancy. According to Bliss and Stern (1982) information, monitoring and observation 
also play a role in this decision. The landlord cannot be present to monitor every action of the 
tenant. Moreover, cash rent requires liquidity which is often binding constraint for village 
households.  Liquidity shortages can thus also provide a reason for sharing cash inputs. 
 Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) have argued that the comparative advantage of the tenant 
may lie in supervising labour, while that of the landlord may lay in managing production 
operations. If the tenant is relatively more efficient at supervising than at management and at 
the same time, the landlord is relatively more efficient at management than supervision, then 
the contract chosen will be sharecropping. However, if the tenant becomes relatively more 
efficient at management, then the contractual choice, to provide the appropriate incentive, 
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will shift towards fixed rent. A further contribution within this framework by Ghatak and 
Pandey (2000) is novel in the sense that it allows for existence of moral hazard in risk taking, 
as well as in effort, and explains the existence of sharecropping contracts as a result of the 
mechanism which balances the moral hazard among its two components. However, the 
Ghatak and Pandey (2000) model is applicable only in conditions where the tenant faces 
limited liability. In Palanpur and similar areas of Northern India, limited liability is 
conspicuous in its absence. It is thus difficult to see this particular model explain the 
existence of sharecropping in Palanpur. 
 It is clear that available theories on tenancy and contract choice, despite being rich in 
their intellectual content, leave quite a lot to be explored and explained empirically. Some of 
these issues were considered important during the early phases of the “green revolution” in 
India and some of these concerns have continued to remain important for understanding the 
formation of factor markets and their functioning in developing country settings such as 
Palanpur. The previous surveys of Palanpur have dealt with some of these issues in detail, in 
particular Bliss and Stern (1982). This paper offers a preliminary attempt at looking at some 
of these issues with the most recent round of data collected from Palanpur during 2008-2010. 
The scope of this paper is limited to analysing various issues related to tenancy in Palanpur. 
Discussion of some of the issues related to farm size productivity debates from the Palanpur 
survey of 2008-2010 is available in Kawatra (2009). Details on the nature of changes in 
agriculture in Palanpur are available in the accompanying paper (Tyagi and Himanshu, 2011).   
Tenancy in Palanpur  
A fairly detailed description of changes in agricultural production and tenancy can be found 
in Tyagi and Himanshu (2011). We highlight here the major changes in the nature of tenancy 
in Palanpur as compared to previous surveys. First, tenancy continues to remain a prominent 
feature of the Palanpur economy. In fact, the area under tenancy continues to show an 
increasing trend since 1974-75 with land under tenancy accounting for almost one-third of 
the operated area of the village. Second, although the area under tenancy shows an increase, 
the percentage of households engaged in the tenancy market out of total village households 
shows a decline from 1983. Third, in 1983 there were more landlords compared to tenants, 
but by 2008, there are more tenants than landlords. Fourth, batai3 remains the largest form of 
tenancy but is no longer the dominant form of tenancy with fixed rent tenancy and chauthai 
jointly contributing to almost half of total tenanted land. Fifth, chauthai has emerged as the 
new form of tenancy. This tenancy contract, which is closer to a “pure” labour contract than a 
“pure” tenancy contract, is a new development in the village. Sixth, there are only two 
households which are simultaneously involved in leasing in and leasing out as against 16 
households (11%) in 1983.   
                                                           
3
 ‘Batai’ is the sharecropping contract in which the tenant pays half of cash inputs, performs himself or hire the 
labour required in the cultivation and receives half of the total output at the harvest time. Peshgi is the fixed rent 
contract with the payments to the landlord made before the season starts (if cash-rent) or at the harvest time (if 
kind rent). Chauthai is a contract where the tenant’s sole responsibility is performing labour (his own or hired) 
and he receives one-fourth of the total output. See Tyagi and Himanshu (2011) for a detailed description of the 
contract arrangements in Palanpur.  
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 These developments in the tenancy market need to be situated in the broader context 
of changes in the labour market, incomes and distribution of assets4. A preliminary analysis 
of some aspects of change in the labour market and migration is available from 
Mukhopadhyay (2011). The essential point emerging from the analysis of the Palanpur 
economy over the decades is that agriculture appears to have a weakening role in determining 
the growth and distribution of incomes. While Palanpur has continued to integrate itself with 
the outside world in the form of employment opportunities and access to markets through 
better communication with the outside world, it has also benefited from the changing 
environment of economic policies which have been important in building such backward and 
forward linkages. Although our understating of the many ways in which these factors operate 
is limited, there is certainly some evidence to indicate that outside jobs are playing an 
important role in determining the demand and supply of labour in the village and also in the 
determination of both agricultural and non-agricultural wages in the village. Some of these 
developments have affected the way agriculture is organised in the village, in particular, the 
institution of tenancy.  
Findings from Discussions  
This paper presents some preliminary results on the possible economic roles played by 
tenancy. It also provides some explanations as to the reasons for dominance of certain 
tenancy contracts and changes over time. Along with questionnaire-based information, 
opinions on some of the issues which have been raised in the existing literature were also 
collected from a sample of households which were engaged in tenancy. A discussion 
questionnaire was designed and a random sample of landlords and tenants were interviewed. 
The sample consisted of 83 farm households (which are 61 percent of all farm households in 
Palanpur engaged in tenancy), with a caste distribution that matches the share of each caste in 
the village’s population. The sample consisted of 48 pure tenants and 23 pure landlords. This 
proportion resembles the distribution of tenants and landlords in the population of total farm 
households of Palanpur participating in tenancy. We were unable to interview any non-
resident of Palanpur who is in a tenancy contract with a Palanpur resident.  
 Figure 1 shows that the major reason for leasing-in land among tenants is the desire to 
earn a higher profit. Apart from this, a majority leases-in land to utilise the excess family 
labour. Utilisation of other household assets like a diesel pump set and money is also a reason 
for leasing in. Figure 2 highlights the major reasons for leasing out for a landlord. A majority 
leases-out because they just do not have adequate family labour to work on the land: a mirror-
image of the situation of tenants. In this sense, the needs of landlords and tenants are clearly 
complementary to each other.  
 Another major reason for leasing out land is the existence of an urgent cash 
requirement. Leasing out land on a fixed rent serves as a substitute for taking loans for these 
households. In fact, there are farmers who believe in the dictum “neither a borrower, nor a 
lender be” and are strictly averse to taking loan. For them, leasing-out land on fixed rent is a 
secured means of meeting urgent cash requirements of the household.   
 Among the other reported reasons for leasing-out, an unusual one is the monkey 
menace on plots. Monkeys are a big menace for the farms in Palanpur and a lot of labour time 
                                                           
4
 It should be noted that the issues of incentive, risk allocation, asymmetric information, indivisibility etc play 
very important role in markets, transactions and institutions in all countries. 
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has to be devoted to vigilance and protection against monkeys. So, landlords lease the land 
out on sharecropping, preferably to a tenant who lives close to the land.  
 Figure 3 shows that sharing of cost and risks are the major reasons for tenants to 
prefer sharecropping to fixed-rent tenancy. Landlords mainly prefer sharecropping as against 
fixed-rent tenancy because it gives them higher profits (Figure 4). Cost-sharing also figures in 
the landlord’s motivation behind sharecropping. Among the other prominent reasons, one 
stands out from the rest. There is a feeling among some farm households that they find it 
difficult to save if they have cash in hand. If they lease-out land on fixed-rent (given they can 
lease it out on sharecropping too), then they will spend the cash earned on consumption (or 
wasteful expenditure, as some said) and by the end of the season they will have neither the 
money, nor the food grains to consume in the next season. Therefore, they find it reasonable 
to lease land only on sharecropping, unless other reasons like cash requirement are dominant.  
 Tenants prefer fixed-rent leases to sharecropping because there are no hassles or 
coordination problems with the landlord (Figure 5). Also, it gives them the highest profit 
among all the other standard leases. We do not have exact statistics on the reasons why 
landlords prefer fixed-rent to sharecropping, as we did not interview the absentee landlords 
who constitute the majority of landlords in fixed-rent. But it should be clear that they find it 
difficult to manage a sharecropping contract when they stay far away and hence find it easier 
to get cash rent for the land.  
 Figure 6 indicates the traits tenants look out for in a prospective landlord and figure 7 
shows the reverse. The trait which matters a lot to both of them is trustfulness. The landlord 
wants the tenant to stay faithful in application of inputs, while the tenant wants the landlord 
to stay faithful regarding the terms of contracts and payment of his input-costs share on time. 
They also seek out a partner who is resourceful with regards to working capital and 
ownership of diesel pump sets. Apart from these, a landlord would like his tenant to be hard-
working and possessing plentiful family labour. The Landlord would also prefer to choose 
tenants from amongst his friends or relatives. Tenants look out for the quality of the soil, 
irrigation facilities on the land and proximity of the tenanted land to owned land.  
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Productivity analysis 
In this section we test the hypothesis that sharecropping is an inefficient system of tenancy 
relative to own cultivation, at least in the particular sense of labour output per bigha. We first 
run simple t tests to find differences between the yields on sharecropped and non-
sharecropped land. We can reject the null hypothesis if we find no significant difference 
between the yields on sharecropped and non-sharecropped land. Subsequently, we use Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to examine the efficiency of sharecropping. 
 We employ two methodologies for testing the hypothesis. The first approach is to test 
the yields of a given crop for households cultivating the crop either on self-cultivated owned 
land or sharecropped land, but not both. We run unpaired t-tests to check if the average yields 
belong to the same categories.  
 Table 1 highlights the summary statistics for this methodology for major crops. The 
column ‘Significance level’ denotes the significance level beyond which the means are 
statistically different from each other. If it is less than 5, then the yields are statistically 
different from each other at 5% level. As the table shows, only for Bajra we can say that the 
yields are statistically different under own land and sharecropped land. But yields are higher 
on sharecropped land than on self-cultivated land; a perverse result, relative to the null 
hypothesis.  
 The second method is to use the data on the households who have cultivated the crop 
on owned land as well as on sharecropped land and then test if the difference in yields as 
obtained on these 2 different groups of land is significantly different. This method is more 
precise in testing the question of efficiency as it controls for various aspects which can vary 
across farm households. We test the hypothesis by running paired t-tests to check if the 
means belong to the same population.  
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Table 1: Efficiency - Methodology I 
Self-cultivated own land Sharecropped land 
Crops 
No of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. No of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Significance 
Level a 
Wheat 71 216.07 51.24 9 239.18 48.15 20.37 
Mentha 83 2.8 1.71 16 2.43 1.94 43 
Paddy 47 186.04 83.74 25 199.57 48.15 52.5 
Bajra 63 50.5 42.7 7 84.7 60 5.7 
Urad 62 28.6 31.7 4 17.83 6.48 50.2 
a. Level shows the minimum significance level at which the means are statistically different 
across two categories 
 
Table 2: Efficiency - Methodology II 
Self-cultivated own land Sharecropped land 
Crops 
No of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. No of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Significance 
Level  a 
Wheat 31 213.06 59.99 31 230.28 54.44 16 
Mentha 15 3.18 2.25 15 3.28 1.76 85.6 
Paddy 7 191.66 95.44 7 166.3 49.29 52.3 
a. Level shows the minimum significance level at which the means are statistically different 
across two categories 
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 Table 2 shows the results and the significance level for means to be different is not 
sufficient to conclude that yields are different among self-cultivated own land or 
sharecropped land. For urad and bajra, the number of observations is insufficient to produce 
any reasonable analysis. 
 We can reject the null hypothesis as we fail to find any significant difference between 
self-cultivated land and sharecropped land for major crops. We find no evidence to suggest 
that sharecropping is an inefficient mode of cultivation as compared to own cultivation, in the 
sense of resulting in lower yields.   
Data Envelopment Analysis 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a non-parametric approach used to test the efficiency 
and productivity of production units, taking into account a given set of possible inputs and 
outputs. It involves the use of linear programming methods to construct a non-parametric 
piecewise frontier over the data, in order to be able to calculate efficiencies relative to this 
frontier. A major advantage of this approach is that there is no need to assume an underlying 
production function for estimating efficiencies. Also, the technique obviates the need for 
price data to arrive at the relative efficiencies of the production units (in this case, farmers). 
This is an appealing feature relative to over those approaches that examine efficiency by 
comparing the value of marginal product with the price of the input5.  
The model in this paper is based on Charles, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). Assume that th 
Decision Making Unit (DMU),  ∈ [1, ], uses i = { } of inputs ( ∈ [1, ]) and produces a 
single output , then X will be a ( x ) input matrix and Y will be a (1 x ) output vector for 
all  DMUs. In the ratio form of the DEA, we will obtain a measure of the ratio of the output 
                                                           
5
 The major point of difference from the methodology used in the previous section to examine the efficiency of 
production units is that the DEA method takes into account not only the output, or yield to be specific, but also 
the input bundle used in the process. Suppose 2 farmers; let us call them A and B, obtain the same amount of 
yield, but farmer A uses lower level of inputs than farmer B. Then,  in the productivity analysis approach 
described above would find both to be equally efficient, but with the DEA approach, the farmer A, who uses 
lower inputs, will be judged more efficient than farmer B.  
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over all inputs,  /	  i, where  is a scalar denoting output weight (as there is a single 
output) and 	 is a  x 1 vector of input weights. We select the optimal weights by specifying 
the following problem: 
Maximize ( /	 i) by choice of  and 	, subject to: 
 j/	 j ≤ 1, j = 1,2,..., 
, 	 ≥ 0 
The above problem finds the value of input weights and output weight such that the DEA 
efficiency measure of the ith unit is maximized, subject to the constraint that all efficiency 
measures are less than or equal to one. A further condition, 	  i = 1 is imposed because the 
above problem has infinite number of solutions. The maximization problem, therefore, takes 
the multiplier form and becomes: 
Maximize (µ ) by choice of µ and ν, subject to: 
14 
 
µ j - ν j ≤ 0, j = 1, 2,...,, 
ν i=1, 
µ, ν ≥ 0 
Here, µ and ν reflect the transformation from  and 	. Using duality in linear programming, 
we derive an equivalent envelopment form of this problem, which is as follows: 
Minimize θ (by choice of θ and λ), subject to: 
- 
 
+ Y λ ≥ 0, 
θ  – X λ ≥ 0 and 
λ ≥ 0 
θ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the technical efficiency score for the th DMU, obtained with input 
orientation and under constant returns to scale. A score of 1 denotes the most efficient DMU, 
the efficiency decreases as θ decreases and a DMU with θ = 0 is the most inefficient DMU. λ 
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is a ( x 1) vector of constants. It is constrained to be non-negative in order to keep the θ 
within the limits of 0 and 1. The envelopment form imposes fewer constraints and is easier to 
solve than the multiplier form.  
The above LP problem has been solved  times, once for each DMU to obtain the efficiency 
score which is being evaluated under different sets of observation as an envelope. We have 
used the DEAP software (version 2.1) for our calculations.  
 We undertake the Data Envelopment Analysis separately for kharif 2008 season (July 
2008 to November 2008) and rabi 2009 season (November 2008 to June 2009).  A similar 
analysis for rabi 1984 (November 1983 to April 1984) and kharif 1984 (July 1984 to 
November 1984) has also been undertaken. The analysis of both the survey years excludes 
the sugarcane crop.   (This exclusion is due to the fact that sugarcane, once cultivated, can 
last for 3 years. Initial costs like land preparation and seed expenditure will be present for the 
crops in first year but will be absent for the mature crops, thereby favouring mature crops in 
efficiency estimation.) Other low-valued crops which were primarily cultivated for home-
consumption and are difficult to value have also been excluded.  
 The variables to be included in the efficiency estimation need to be selected carefully 
because an increase in the number of inputs or outputs tends to increase the number of 
efficient units. It is very likely that when an extra variable is added to the DEA model, an 
inefficient unit will dominate on the added dimension and will become efficient. Hence, a 
parsimonious use of variables is essential to avoid losing the explanatory power of the model. 
Accordingly, we have selected only those inputs which are a common practice in the 
agriculture of the village (excluding for example, expenditure on sowing by machine because 
it is a relative infrequent practice, generally seed is sown manually with no cash input cost for 
the sowing itself). 
 Prices of inputs do not pose such a problem because they have stayed more or less 
constant during the agricultural year in question. We are viewing efficiency here as producing 
higher output value on a bigha per rupee spent on each input, therefore the inputs and outputs 
are not in physical terms. The prices used for valuing inputs have been kept the same for all 
the farmers and have been carefully selected to reflect the actual price during the year.  
 In the 2008-09 analysis, the inputs we have included in the DEA model are: land 
preparation, seeds, basal fertilizer, top dressing fertilizer, irrigation, labour and harvesting. 
For 1983-84, we have excluded the land preparation variable because of the lack of data on 
this input.  
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 We consider only one output variable, which is the value of output per bigha6. Prices 
for certain crops fluctuate on a daily or weekly basis. Variations in the output value per bigha 
based on price changes will distort the estimation of efficiency in the favour of those farmers 
who sold their output when the price was high. Therefore, crop prices have been carefully 
selected to reflect the average prices during the time of harvest and a single price value is 
used for each crop. 
 For testing the differences in the efficiency of self-cultivated and leased farms in 
Palanpur, we employ 2 major sets of methodologies. The first methodology takes into 
account only those farms, which leased-in area under batai contract and also cultivated on 
owned land. For each of these farm households, we therefore, have 2 separate input and 
output variables. We treat each household as 2 decision making units, one for a self-
cultivation farm and the other for batai, and for each DMU, we run the DEA model as 
described above. If farmers in Palanpur treat batai as secondary to self-cultivation, then we 
should expect to see a clear domination of self-cultivation in efficiency estimates.  
 Table 3 presents the summary of the technical efficiency estimate ‘θ’ for the seasons 
in question. For the kharif 2008 season, the mean efficiency score of self-cultivated farms in 
this group is 0.68, which is slightly lower than the corresponding score for batai. For rabi 
2009, the score is the same for both self-cultivated farm and farms under batai. When we 
calculate the difference between the means of efficiency score on self-cultivated farms and 
batai farms using t-tests, the results of which are not presented here, we find no statistically 
significant difference. We do the same analysis for rabi 1984 (See Table 4) and we find that 
the mean efficiency score for self-cultivated farm is 5 percentage points higher than that for 
batai farms. However, the difference in mean is not statistically significant. Moreover, when 
we run the test for kharif 1984, the mean efficiency score for batai farms is higher than the 
self-cultivated plots. The difference in mean, in this case, is also statistically significant, 
indicating that batai farms on the average were more efficient, in the DEA sense, than the 
self-cultivated farms in kharif 1984.  
 These results clearly indicate that farmers, who operate on batai farm as well as self-
cultivated farm, do not give strict preference to self-cultivated farms as against the batai farm. 
There is nothing to support the claim that with respect to input application and output 
production, the batai farms are inefficient relative to self-cultivated farms. This aligns well 
with farmers’ responses to our 2008-09 discussion survey. When asked ‘if they follow better 
agricultural practices on self-cultivated land as compared to land they lease on batai’, an 
overwhelming 58 of the 60 tenants reported that practices on both the lands are the same.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Comparing technical efficiency 
between select farms (2008-09) 
                                                           
6
 In Palanpur, 15.8 bigha is equal to 1 hectare. 
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Type Obs. Mean of 'θ' 
Kharif 2008 
Self 22 0.68 
Batai 22 0.71 
Rabi 2009 
Self 25 0.74 
Batai 25 0.74 
 
 
Table 4: Comparing technical efficiency 
between select farms (1983-84) 
Type Obs. Mean of 'θ' 
Rabi 1984 
Self 36 0.87 
Batai 36 0.82 
Kharif 1984 
Self 27 0.38 
Batai 27 0.48 
 
 We also tested the relative efficiency of the farm households discussed above to other 
farm households in Palanpur, to see how the batai farms perform when competing against all 
the other farms (including the self-cultivated portion of the same farmer). As before, we run 
separate DEA model for kharif 2008, rabi 2009, rabi 1984 and kharif 1984.  
 Table 5 and 6 present the summary of technical efficiency estimates ‘θ’. For Kharif 
2008, the mean efficiency score is higher for batai and chauthai (among which, batai is the 
“real” sharecropping contract in 2008-09 survey round, while chauthai is more of a labour-
contract, see Tyagi and Himanshu (2011)) than self-cultivation farms. An even higher 
difference in mean efficiency score between batai farms and self-cultivated farms exist for 
Rabi 2009. For Rabi 1984, the mean efficiency score for batai is slightly lower than that for 
self-cultivated farms. However, for kharif 1984, the mean efficiency score for batai is higher 
relative to self-cultivated farms.  
 Table 7 presents the distribution of efficient and inefficient units in different lease 
contracts for the 2 seasons in the year 2008-09. In cultivation, there are many factors outside 
the control of the farmer that can affect efficiency negatively. There may be untimely rains 
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affecting some farmers more than the others, technical failure in equipment, illness in the 
family among many other things. Therefore, a farmer with an efficiency score slightly below 
1 may be efficient in the sense that he did his best but due to uncontrollable factors could not 
earn an efficiency score of 1. Therefore, we treat all the farms with efficiency score greater 
than or equal to 0.9 as efficient (except for Kharif 1984, where average efficiency is lower 
and therefore, we have used 0.8 and above as the definition of efficient units). All the rest are 
deemed to be inefficient. 
 For Kharif 2008, we find that the proportion of efficient units in batai is more than 
double as compared to self-cultivation. In Rabi 2009, the proportion of efficient units is 
almost the same in batai and self-cultivation. Table 8 presents a similar analysis for the year 
1983-84. The proportion of efficient farms in batai contract is almost the same as in self-
cultivated farms for Rabi 1984. However, considering the kharif 1984 season, batai farms 
have a higher percentage of efficient units than do self-cultivated farms.  
 
Table 5: Summary of Technical Efficiency Estimates (2008-09) 
Kharif 2008 Rabi 2009 
Type 
Obs Mean of 'θ' Obs Mean of 'θ' 
Self 142 0.52 123 0.52 
Batai 49 0.62 35 0.66 
Peshgi 35 0.55 27 0.5 
Chauthai 4 0.71 - - 
 
Table 6: Summary of Technical Efficiency Estimates (1983-84) 
Rabi 1984 Kharif 1984 
Type 
Obs Mean of 'θ' Obs Mean of 'θ' 
Self 71 0.8 70 0.34 
Batai 41 0.75 37 0.45 
Peshgi 10 0.76 7 0.43 
Chauthai 2 0.89 2 0.14 
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Table 7: Distribution of Efficient and Inefficient Units (2008-09) 
Inefficient Efficient 
Type 
Freq % Freq % 
Total 
Kharif 2008 
Self 104 85 19 15 123 
Batai 22 63 13 37 35 
Peshgi 22 81 5 19 27 
Total 148 80 37 20 185 
Rabi 2009 
Self 110 83 22 17 132 
Batai 27 82 6 18 33 
Peshgi 22 76 7 24 29 
Chauthai 3 100 0 0 3 
Total 162 82 35 18 197 
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Table 8: Distribution of Efficient and Inefficient Units (1983-84) 
Inefficient Efficient 
Type 
Freq % Freq % 
Total 
Rabi 1984 
Self 56 79 15 21 71 
Batai 33 80 8 20 41 
Peshgi 8 80 2 20 10 
Chauthai 1 50 1 50 2 
Total 98 79 26 21 124 
Kharif 1984 a 
Self 62 89 8 11 70 
Batai 27 73 10 27 37 
Peshgi 5 71 2 29 7 
Chauthai 2 100 0 0 2 
Total 96 83 20 17 116 
 
Because of lower average efficiency figure, 0.8 and above is used as a 
definition for efficient units, instead of usual 0.9.  
 
 Taking together the results from this, and the preceding, section, we can conclude that 
there is no reason to suggest that sharecropped farms are cultivated inefficiently in Palanpur. 
If anything, it appears that batai farms perform better than self-cultivated farms by a slight 
margin. There could be a number of reasons for this. First, with the exception of the quality 
of labour inputs being applied, landlords in Palanpur find it relatively easy to monitor the 
application of all the other inputs. Land preparation is a standard mechanised process and 
landlord can easily monitor the instances of ploughing done. Usually, either the landlord or 
the tenant owns irrigation equipment and therefore timely irrigation can always be arranged 
for. Quality of seeds and the amount of fertilisers applied (both of which are shared equally 
among the landlord and the tenant) are not so easy to monitor but in the event that the 
landlord discovers that the tenant is applying lower quality seeds and is not applying the 
agreed-upon quantity of fertilizer, the tenant will be discredited and the lease may not be 
continued the next season. Moreover, given the high number of prospective tenants as 
compared to landlords, it will be difficult for a tenant with a damaged reputation to find 
another lease. For a landlord, ensuring that manual labour of good quality is being applied 
remains a tricky issue but the problem is not so severe because a landlord can always be 
careful to choose only a hard-working tenant. Palanpur is a small village, people know each 
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other well and information on the skills of the prospective tenant is easy to acquire. 
Therefore, as far as monitoring and supervision is concerned, Palanpur landlords can do a 
good job if they put in a reasonable level of effort.  
 Moreover, there are some obvious gains from an arrangement like batai. Some of 
them have been mentioned in the ‘findings from discussions’ section. It is not uncommon that 
farmers find themselves unable to provide timely inputs such as fertilizer or, irrigation 
because they are running low on working capital. In batai, it is very common for one partner 
(be it landlord or tenant) to incur a cost in full, so that the cultivation operation can be 
completed on time, and to then be repaid by his partner later. This is normally an interest free 
loan from one party to the other. For a self-cultivating farmer, working capital shortages 
imply that he would have to take a small loan from the village money-lender (with interest 
between 3 to 5 per cent per month). If such a loan is not readily available, he would have to 
compromise on the cultivation practice, leading to inefficiency in production. This is not to 
say that there are no disagreements between landlord and the tenant. But for the village as a 
whole, the instances of disagreements are a lot fewer in number than the instances of mutual 
cooperation in time of need.  In addition to the advantage of timeliness, where more than one 
input source or its finance might be available, there is the general argument that discussion 
may produce better decisions – “two heads may be better than one”.  
 Therefore, neither empirically, nor theoretically do we find any strong reason to 
expect that sharecropping is an inefficient institution relative to self-cultivation in the village.  
Why tenancy and sharecropping? 
Management and supervision are generally the key ingredients when more than one person is 
involved in cultivation. Both of these inputs depend on various observable and unobservable 
factors.  Management of the farm is influenced by and is related to the land preparation assets 
the household owns, ownership of irrigation equipments, cash-flows at the household’s 
disposal which also includes credit availability, cultivation knowledge and organizational 
skills. Supervision on the other hand deals with executing the work to be done as well as 
possible in order to raise productivity (in the context of the incentive structure in place) of 
land and other factors as far as possible. Supervision is influenced mainly by the dexterity, 
physical ability and sincerity of the labour. A household may be strong in both the 
components at a given time or may be weak in one or other.  
 We use the term “management ability” here to cover both the ownership of assets 
which allow the farming of land (tractors, diesel pump set etc) and the ability to organize. 
The former is likely to be correlated with the latter. Supervision being labour intensive, is 
characterised particularly in terms of the availability of the appropriate type of labour. 
 We can broadly categorize Palanpur farm households in the following categories: 
 I. Management categories: 
 1. Households with high management ability relative to land owned - such households 
own cultivation assets like tractors, diesel pump sets, tube wells  cultivation experience and 
suitable cash-flows for cultivation but, but do not own enough land to employ these assets 
fully.  
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 2. Households with management ability which fits well with land owned – these 
households own cultivation assets which are just enough, or we can say “optimal”, for self-
cultivation.  
 3. Households with lower management ability relative to land owned - such 
households possess larger landholdings than can be optimally cultivated given the 
households’ cultivation assets such as a tractor, tubewell, diesel pump sets, cultivation 
experience and suitable cash-flows for cultivation. 
 II. Supervision categories: 
 4. Households with high supervision ability relative to land owned– These are 
households whose labour to land owned ratio is quite high. Agricultural labour tends to be 
seasonal in nature and getting a wage job is not assured. Due to social norms, women do not 
work as a daily wage labourers on farms. Outside jobs are not regularly available and not all 
the labourers possess the necessary skills for specialised jobs. As a result, a considerable 
number of household members may remain unemployed for a significant number of days in a 
month.  
 5. Households with supervision ability fitting well to land owned – this group has 
family labour available for work in agriculture, appropriate to that required for the cultivation 
of the land in their possession.  
 6. Households with lower supervision ability relative to land owned– this group owns 
large amount of land relative to labour power to work the land optimally. It includes the 
households who are on the richer scale of income and could afford sending their children to 
better schools and colleges. Many of them found employment in services within or outside 
the village and are unable to devote themselves full time to cultivation practices. As a result, 
the labour power required to work on farm is very limited within the household. This group 
also includes those who on the basis of ownership of the farm mechanized assets have started 
providing mechanized services like tube well irrigation, land preparation by tractor, etc, to 
other farmers in the village. 
 Both management and supervision are, to some degree, difficult to market and cannot, 
therefore, be adjusted in the short run to the household’s requirement for them. The 
household takes account of the management and supervision at its disposal and decides the 
potential area it can cultivate. Tenancy arises, or at least, is sought, when the owned land 
amount is different from the potential area that the farmer can cultivate.  
 Based on the discussions with a sample of landlords and tenants (as presented before), 
we can broadly outline the factors influencing the choice to enter the tenancy market and the 
contract to be chosen. Table 9 highlights the general preferences of households given the 
management and supervision categories to which they belong.  
 Table 9 indicates that households try to adjust their land under cultivation and tenancy 
contract to fit with their management and supervision ability and thus to make appropriate 
use of these not-so-perfectly marketed factors. That is the basic hypothesis. It is based on the 
above reasoning and on the discussion material (Table 9).  
 We have tried to examine this hypothesis using our data on tenancy. Table 11 presents 
regression results of leased-out land using area under particular leases as a dependent 
variable. Table 10 presents the descriptive statistics for this exercise. Important results from 
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the regression are as follows. First, absence of appropriate management and supervision 
ability combined with or without a credit need, is the main motivation behind leasing out on 
Peshgi. The dummy variable on Loan outstanding is significant only at the 10% level but this 
is perhaps not surprising; loan and peshgi are substitutes for each other to a considerable 
degree, although they are not perfect substitutes. Informal credit is the primary source of 
loans in Palanpur for a majority of the households and considering the high interest rates 
these are associated with, many households prefer to lease out land on Peshgi rather than 
taking out loans. In out sample we therefore observe some households who do not have a 
loan outstanding but who have leased out the land on Peshgi in order to meet their credit 
needs. As the coefficient on the loan outstanding dummy is significant at 10% level, this 
offers some support to the notion that households with a credit crunch are likely to lease out 
land on Peshgi. It appears that many households choose a middle path of leasing out some 
land on Peshgi and taking out a loan as well.  
 Secondly, households who lease out on batai are likely to have low family labour 
along with a certain lack of cash flows to invest in agriculture. We can regard households 
with life insurance policy and salaried employment as those who have sufficient cash flows to 
invest in agriculture. The significant negative coefficients on both these variables highlight 
that lack of cash flows is a main reason to lease out on batai. It is instructive to note that 
salaried employment also implies a lack of family labour to a certain extent and can work in 
favour of leasing out land to access the labour power of a potential tenant. But the 
supervision component here is already significant indicating that the effect of salaried 
employment is purely financial in nature.  
 Thirdly, the education of the head is positively related to leasing out land on batai. 
There is a view in the village that educated young adults are not inclined towards agriculture 
because they look down upon the physical labour or because they believe that they are better 
at managing farm operations as compared to working themselves on agriculture. The 
coefficient is small in absolute value but may be capturing this growing perspective.  
 Fourthly, rich households with high management ability lease out on Chauthai. The 
supervision component is not significant here but possibly in this case we are unable to 
capture the actual factor influencing the supervision ability of the household. Even if rich 
households have sufficient labour power to devote to cultivation of their own land, they may 
feel inclined to divert some of that labour power to activities that take them off the farm.. 
Given a choice between strenuous manual labour on their own field or a relatively 
comfortable job of land preparation on the farm of others through the hiring out of tractor or 
tube well services a richer farmer can reject the physical labour work while leasing out his 
land on Chauthai to ensure that the appropriate amount of labour is applied on his farm.  
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Table 9: Tenancy decisions 
Management 
category 
Supervision 
category Contract 
1 (high) 4 (high) Lease in on Peshgi. 
1 (high) 5 (optimum) Lease in on Peshgi and if required, hire labour to do the 
work. 
1 (high) 6 (low) Lease out on Chauthai. 
2 (optimum) 4 (high) Lease in on Batai. 
2 (optimum) 5 (optimum) No lease. 
2 (optimum) 6 (low) Lease out on Chauthai. 
3 (low) 4 (high) Lease in on Chauthai.  
3 (low) 5 (optimum) Lease out on Batai with certain member of the household 
not actively engaged in agriculture anymore.  
3 (low) 6 (low) Lease out on Peshgi.  
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Table 10  : Descriptive Statistics 
All households Land owning households 
Variable 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Tractors owned 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.28 
Diesel Pump sets owned 0.38 0.55 0.46 0.57 
Loan Outstanding dummy 0.50 0.50 0.57 0.50 
Kisan Credit Card (KCC) dummy 0.26 0.44 0.32 0.47 
Kuccha house dummy 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.34 
Adult males engaged in agriculture 1.36 1.05 1.48 1.05 
Total land owned 9.52 11.99 11.79 12.31 
Pucca house dummy 0.33 0.47 0.35 0.48 
Business/enterprise dummy 0.28 0.45 0.30 0.46 
Maximum education of household head 6.50 4.47 6.90 4.49 
Life insurance policy dummy 0.27 0.44 0.30 0.46 
Salaried employment dummy 0.19 0.40 0.20 0.40 
Tubewell owned 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.25 
Thakur dummy 0.23 0.42 0.27 0.44 
Murao dummy 0.26 0.44 0.30 0.46 
Members who worked in agriculture per bigha 
of own land 0.32 0.50 0.40 0.53 
Asset rank lowest quintile dummy 0.19 0.40 0.16 0.36 
Jatab caste dummy 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.38 
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Table 11: Regression results - Leased-out Land 
 Peshgi Batai 1 Batai 2 Chauthai 
Constant 0.65 ** (.312) 0.471 (0.681) 1.168*** (0.676) -0.574 (0.629) 
Tractor  - 1.597* (0.575)   6.833* (1.236) 
Diesel Pump sets -0.466*** (0.275)   -1.435** (0.647) 
Loan Outstanding 0.487*** (0.283)    
KCC dummy    1.856* (0.73) 
Kuchha House 0.716*** (0.409)    
Adult males in Agri. -0.419* (0.136) -0.801* (0.315) -0.9* (0.312) -0.197 (0.327) 
Total own land 0.061* (0.014) 0.186* (0.029) 0.205* (0.029)  
Pucca house dummy    1.572** (0.712) 
Business dummy  -1.267*** (0.737) -1.453** (0.733) 0.812 (0.772) 
Max education of head  0.157* (0.08) 0.188** (0.08)  
Life insurance policy  -1.683** (0.716) -1.323*** (0.724)  
Salaried employment 
dummy  -1.663** (0.849) -1.54*** (0.824)  
Tubewell     3.645* (1.376) 
Thakur dummy  1.665** (0.742)   
Murao dummy   -2.01* (0.723)  
R2 0.154 0.3 0.31 0.25 
N 176 176 176 176 
*  significant at 1% level 
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 10% level 
Standard errors in the brackets.  
Notes: 
1. The dependent variable is area under the particular lease.  
2. Landless households have been ignored in this regression as they practically cannot lease out land. There has been a 
case of a household leasing in land to lease it out further but it is an exception.  
3. Two regressions on batai differ because of the caste dummy included. The first one includes Thakur caste, while the 
second one includes Murao caste.  
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Table 12: Regressions Results - Leased-in Land 
 Peshgi Batai Chauthai 
Constant 0.024 (0.337) 0.733 (0.579) -0.183 (0.25) 
Tractor  1.659*** (0.895) 1.512 (0.734)  
Diesel Pump sets 1.035** (0.423) 2.161* (0.035)  
Adult males in agriculture 0.126 (0.192) 0.77* (0.65)  
Members working in agri 
per bi of owned land   0.752** (0.384) 
Total own land -0.053** (0.021) -0.109* (0.66)  
Pucca house dummy 0.264** (0.121) 1.184*** (0.071)  
Business dummy 1.403* (0.451) 1.282*** (0.765)  
Max education of  head  -0.137** (0.677)  
Life insurance policy 0.63 (0.451)   
Salaried employment 
dummy  0.031 (1.401)  
KCC dummy  -0.324 (0.579) 1.856* (0.73) 
Asset rank lowest quintile   1.49* (0.496) 
Jatab dummy   2.385* (0.548) 
R2 0.16 0.16 0.19 
N 217 218 201 
*  significant at 1% level 
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 10% level 
Standard errors in the brackets.  
Note:  
1. The area under specific lease is the dependent variable.  
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Table 13: Summary of Regression Results 
Management ability Supervision ability Outcome 
Low Low Peshgi Leased out 
Lacking on Cash-flows Low Batai Leased out 
High Low Chauthai Leased out 
High with significantly 
higher cash flows Low, moderate or high 
Peshgi Leased in with hiring in labour if 
lacking on supervision ability 
Moderate High Batai Leased-in 
Low High Chauthai Leased In 
   
 Table 12 presents similar regression results for the leased-in land under different 
contracts. The main findings are as follows. First, the main motivation behind leasing in land 
on Peshgi appears to be management related in nature, with an excess of labour power not 
playing such an important role. Households who have sufficient cash flows to invest in 
agriculture (run own farm business, own a pucca house) and who also own farm equipment 
are likely to lease land in on Peshgi. The family labour variable in this case is not significant. 
This is not surprising considering the alternatives the household has when faced with an 
excess of management but a lack of supervision ability. A farmer with an abundance of farm 
equipment and enough cash to keep the cultivation process running smoothly is in a very 
good position to hire labour to work on the Peshgi land. It would not be efficient to lease in 
land on batai, hire labour to work the land, and settle for a smaller share than in Peshgi.  It is 
impractical to lease in land on Chauthai when the farmer is relatively weak with the 
supervision component.  
 Secondly, households leasing in on batai are likely to have high supervision ability 
but relatively moderate management ability. The variable for diesel pump sets is significant 
with a high coefficient but other indicators of management ability like own business, salaried 
employment, tractor, and Kisan credit card are not significant.  Households leasing in land on 
batai appear to be cash-flow constrained households with ownership of farm equipment and 
family labour in excess of what is required to work on their own farm. Their asset position 
seems to motivate them to look for a partner who can share costs with them.  
 Thirdly, Chauthai is the preferred contract for relatively poor households who own 
very high family labour relative to the land they own. These households belong to the lowest 
of asset category in the village and are mainly Jatabs, a caste group which has very low 
ownership of land per capita but high population.  
 Table 13 summarises the results from the regression exercise. The results go well with 
our hypothesis that households attempt to adjust their operational holding to the supervision 
and management factors they command and resort to sharecropping to achieve this end. This 
line of reasoning also explains the rise of Peshgi and Chauthai contracts at the cost of Batai 
post 1983-84. Due to household partitioning, sale of land to outsiders and migration of a 
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number of households, we observe a considerable decline in land owned per capita. So, the 
population pressure on land in 2008-9 is higher than in 1983-84. Technological change has 
occurred in irrigation and land preparation but the distribution of assets remains very unequal. 
Thus, on the one hand we have rich households with cultivation equipment and machinery, 
but who are unable to employ these assets fully on their own landholdings due to their small 
size. On the other hand, we have relatively poor households in terms of land owned and farm 
equipment, with an excess of family labour able to work in agriculture. The former group of 
households find Peshgi to be a suitable contract while the latter group of households favour a 
Chauthai contract. As a result, we see a reduction in the share of Batai contracts in the total 
leased in area and a rise in Chauthai and Peshgi.    
A related comparison over time 
A model proposed in Bliss and Stern (1982) to identify the determinants of the Net leased in 
area bears some resemblance to the approach taken here. The Bliss and Stern (1982) model 
concluded that family labour and bullock power for land preparation are two major non-
marketed factors which determine the area a household will lease in7. We present a similar 
model here to highlight how changes in the market have shaped tenancy decisions. Table 14 
presents the major variables and the descriptive statistics. Before proceeding, some notes on 
the variables are in order.  
 The number of adult males aged 15-61 engaged in agriculture is a suitable indicator 
for the labour power at the disposal of the household but it is not fully satisfactory. It neglects 
the role of women and to some extent the role of children engaged in agriculture. Women in 
Palanpur are actively engaged in agriculture (except in the richer households). Moreover, 
agriculture in Palanpur during this time was afflicted with a problem of monkeys damaging 
the crops and the labour of children played an important role in protecting the fields from 
monkeys. So, we need a measure of not only the males engaged in agriculture but the actual 
labour power engaged in agriculture. To this end, the variable AGMEM has been included.  
 The variable used for land preparation equipment (V1) is the number of items of 
equipment owned and not their actual value; the same goes for irrigation equipment (NPSO1, 
ENGINE and TW). The calculation of the value of these equipments is not a difficult task but 
it has not been included because the value of these assets is not a reliable indicator of the 
current services they render. A 10 yr old tractor worth Rs 100,000 in the village is able to do 
almost the same task as a Rs 600,000 new tractor. The smaller horse-powered engine with 
lower value irrigates a field somewhat less rapidly than a large engine, but this does not make 
such a big difference. There is a difference in the fuel consumption among the assets with 
differing values but it is not great enough to offset the variation attributable to differences in 
value for the purpose of measuring performance.  
 The asset ranking variable which has been presented here is the quintile ranking 
obtained through principal component analysis and those assets groups have been chosen 
(productive or non-productive) for which the ranking had the highest correlation with the per 
capita annual expenditure of the households.  
 The regression equation for the model is: 
 NLIR = a.LANDO + b.AGRIMEM + c.ENGINE + K + ε 
                                                           
7
 For further details, refer to chapter 5 in Bliss and Stern (1982). 
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 Where ε is an error term with mean zero and the error terms for different households 
are independently and identically distributed.  
 Table 15 presents the results from this regression. Owned land is negatively 
associated with the NLIR: for a bigha of extra land owned, the NLIR is expected to decline 
by 0.6 bighas. Having one extra member in the household to work in agriculture leads to 1.5 
bighas of more land leased-in. Owning an engine is the most important variable in its 
marginal effect and leads to 4.4 bighas of land being leased-in net.  
 
Table 14: Description of major variables 
Variables Description Mean S.D. 
NLI Net Leased in Area in Rabi 09 1.6 9.9 
CULT Operational Area in Rabi 09 12.3 11.3 
LANDO Land Owned in Rabi 09 10.6 11.0 
F3 Number of adult males between the age 15-61 
engaged in agriculture 1.8 1.3 
V1 Number of Tractors or ox-plough available, basically 
a dummy for own land preparation equipments. 0.2 0.4 
NPSO1 Number of diesel pump sets plus tubewell owned 0.5 0.7 
LOFA Land owned per standardized family member. LOFA 
= (LANDO)/(1* No of Adult Males + 0.8* No of 
Adult Females + 0.5* No of Children) 2.5 2.6 
C1 Dummy for caste Thakur 0.3 0.4 
C2 Dummy for caste Murao 0.3 0.5 
C7 Dummy for caste Passi 0.0 0.1 
C56 Dummy for Muslim 0.1 0.3 
C8 Dummy for caste Jatab 0.2 0.4 
AGMEM Number of household members which actually 
worked in agriculture for more than 10 days in Rabi 
09. 
2.8 1.9 
SAL Dummy for any member being employed in regular 
job 
0.2 0.4 
HOUSING Number of total rooms in the house 2.8 1.7 
ARANK Asset Ranking of the households8 3.2 1.4 
ENGINE Number of Engines owned 0.4 0.6 
TW Number of Tubewell owned (either 0 or 1) 0.1 0.2 
KCC Dummy for Kisan Credit Card 0.3 0.5 
    
 Among the variables not in the equation, LOFA is significant if included in the 
equation as a single extra variable. Among the caste variables significant under 10% level, 
being a Passi imply that the household will be leasing out around 8 bighas of the land in net. 
                                                           
8
 The variable has been calculated over the productive assets (eg: tractor, thresher, diesel pump set, land etc) and 
durable non-productive asset (eg: cycle, motor vehicle, mobile phones, TV etc) through Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA). It excludes financial assets and should not be seen as an “overall wealth” indicator. 
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 Passis migrated in Palanpur many years ago from Eastern U.P. Members of the caste 
were employed in well-paid outside employment and came to own a substantial land area in 
the village over time. Despite substantial land ownership in the village, it is very common to 
see some of the household members, generally male adults, working out of Palanpur. It can 
be said that outside employment is a persistent characteristic of this caste. Many of the Passi 
households with some land in Palanpur, migrated out fully for work, thereby increasing the 
per capita land ownership for this caste. Those that remain in the village face a shortage of 
labour power and resort to leasing out land. Being a Jatab implies that the household will be 
leasing in 3 bighas of land in net and the coefficient is almost significant at the 5% level. The 
remaining variables not in the equation are not significant if included in the model.  
 
Table 15: Regression Results 
Dependent variable: NLIR  
Number of observations 181  
R-squared  0.3383 
Adj R-squared  0.3270  
Root MSE  8.19  
Variables in the equation  
   Coef.  Std. Err.       P>t  
LANDO  -0.59  0.06  0  
AGMEM  1.5  0.35  0  
ENG  4.4  1.3  0.001  
_K  1.6 1.1  0.156 
Variables not in the equation  
LOFA  -1.62  0.4  0  
TW  2.65  2.72  0.33  
Caste 1  -0.6  1.48  0.67  
Caste 2  0.15  1.3  0.91  
Caste 7  -8.1  4.7  0.085  
Caste 8  3.05  1.6  0.057  
    
 Comparing the results for this model with the similar model in Bliss and Stern (1982), 
we find a striking change. Instead of the ‘value of draught animal’ which was significant in 
the model, we have number of the diesel pump sets owned as significant in the model.  This 
is an important change and is a direct result of the change in the nature of the markets, 
technology and assets.  
 In 1974-75, bullocks were the main sources for land preparation. The market for the 
hiring out of bullock services was absent because of the particular care bullocks require for 
usage in agriculture. Bullocks are not the same as any mechanical equipment and 
mistreatment can lead to ill health of bullocks or even death.  Also, ploughing other person’s 
farm with one’s own bullocks was seen as ‘manual labour for others’, which was not a 
particularly respectful occupation in the village. Today ploughing of land has been taken over 
almost entirely by tractors and a farmer can get as much land ploughed as he wants at a fixed 
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rate per bigha. There are now 13 tractors in the village and around 10 of them are employed 
commercially. Driving your own tractor and ploughing another person’s farm is not seen as 
‘demeaning’ in the village. 
 The practice of tilling and harrowing is standardized with rates the same across all the 
service providers (except in case of personal relations). The market is competitive in nature 
and the tractor owners can plough almost as much land as they want at the given price. There 
is no tendency seen among the tractor owners to offer a lower price to attract more customers. 
In sum, the imperfection associated with the land preparation has disappeared. Those who 
own a tractor do not necessarily have to lease in land to reap the advantages of owning a 
tractor. They can easily enter the business of providing land preparation services and make 
money. Ownership of a tractor is an important part of a household’s management ability, but 
there are other more important factors affecting management ability and influencing the 
tenancy decision.  
 The market for irrigation, on the other hand, has become quite imperfect. While 
superficially it may appear that the market for irrigation is the same as the market for hiring-
in equipment, it is actually three markets for providing one homogenous good. The good 
involved here is water, or as we measure it, the irrigated area per hour (because the rates are 
generally charged per hour for irrigation). There are three ways to irrigate a field: 
(i) Own pumpset: If the farmer owns a diesel pumpset then he will generally use 
it to irrigate his fields. A diesel pumpset is portable (it is attached to a wheeled 
cart) and can be transported to and from the field using manual labour or using 
bullocks. The cost of irrigating one bigha from an owned engine is in the 
range of Rs 35-37 depending on the diesel cost. There are problems associated 
with attaching the pumpset to a boring, transporting it to the field and bringing 
it back, inconvenience associated with going to the nearest town for fetching 
diesel etc.  
(ii) Hired pumpset: Those who do not own an engine can hire a diesel pumpset to 
irrigate their fields.  During Kharif 2008, the per hour rent (known as ‘aapasi’) 
for the engine was Rs 35 per hour. So, the average cost to irrigate a bigha with 
a hired pumpset is Rs 70-72. A hired pumpset presents all the inconveniences 
associated with diesel pumpsets and poses some additional problems of its 
own. The market for diesel pumpsets appears almost competitive in nature as 
the rate is given but the buyer cannot transact as much as he wants at the going 
rate. The owner of the pumpset is a farmer himself and may require the 
pumpset for his own usage. So, at times it can be difficult to find a pumpset 
for hire. Also, hirers of a pumpset are not generally as careful with it as the 
owner do and so hired-out units depreciate more quickly than non-marketed 
pump sets, making owners selective in terms of who they agree to hire-out to. 
So, the market for hired pump sets is not as competitive as one might suppose 
it to be. 
(iii) Tubewell (hired): The market for tube well services is a fairly restricted one, 
because tubewell owners cannot sell as much as they want.  It is easy to 
saturate the market. This is because tubewells are not portable like diesel 
pumpsets. They are erected on the field and can only serve the plots nearby 
through water channels or flexible plastic tubes. There are 13 tubewells in the 
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village. During kharif 2008, one hour of tubewell irrigation use cost Rs 30-35 
per hour. Tubewells avoid many of the inconveniences associated with 
pumpset irrigation as the setting up time is more rapid and relatively few 
pieces of equipment have to be transported to the field. But, they are 
concentrated mainly around the residential areas of the village and beyond this 
circle, are not generally available.. Thus, not all farmers can avail of tubewell 
irrigation. Moreover, electricity supply is erratic and may not be available for 
days at a time. There are queues at the tubewell for irrigation and in busy 
periods waiting times can be prolonged. Tubewell owners give preference to 
their relatives, caste members or friends and side payments sometimes occur, 
such as the offer of a liquor bottle. Tubewells thus present their own sets of 
problems. 
(iv) Tubewell (Own): Large farmers whose landholdings are concentrated in one 
place may own a tubewell for irrigation of their own plots. They may also hire 
the tubewell out when they have no need for it. These farmers pay an 
electricity payment of Rs 690 per month, irrespective of electricity 
consumption, and also incur depreciation and repair costs. Since they also hire 
out their tubewell services these farmers do not normally end up incurring any 
running costs for their own irrigation.  
 So, in the market for irrigation, a randomly selected farmer may either be using his 
own pumpset, using his own tubewell, using a hired pumpset or paying for tubewell 
irrigation. Depending on the category he belongs to, he pays a different cost. In this sense, it 
can be said that the market for irrigation is actually a combination of four different markets, 
with four different prices. A farmer may be in more than one market at a time (example: he 
can irrigate his field by tubewell and may also have an engine or be hiring-in an engine).  
 The market for irrigation is, thus, quite imperfect.  And yet irrigation is one of the 
most important factors in Palanpur agriculture. Hiring out your own pumpset involves some 
complexities and leasing in land may be an appropriate method to increase earnings.  If the 
farmer owns a tube well, then hiring out tubewell services is an easy way to increase earnings 
and the family may even opt to lease out land to solely concentrate on the tubewell business. 
In sum, imperfections in the irrigation market have become more prominent than 
imperfections in the land preparation market were in 1974-75.  It is for this reason that we see 
a change of variables in the model.  
 Nonetheless, the changing nature of the markets still supports the original Bliss and 
Stern model’s essence that tenancy exists in order to remove imperfections and indivisibilities 
associated with markets other than land. 
Conclusion 
In Palanpur, the two-and-a-half decades since 1983-84 have been marked by a significant 
reduction in per capita owned and operated land. The proportion of households participating 
in tenancy markets has declined but the area under tenancy has remained roughly the same in 
absolute terms. Given the decline in total land owned and land operated by villagers, tenanted 
area has come to exert a greater influence on the livelihood of farm households in Palanpur.   
 Sharecropped land was found to be at least as productive as self-cultivated land, a 
conclusion which, in the circumstances of Palanpur, and arguably much of rural India can be 
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understood in terms of basic economic reasoning. The mechanization of farm processes, 
almost equal cost-sharing among the partners in batai contracts and efficient stipulation of 
labour efforts in Chauthai contracts provide little reason to believe that productivity will be 
different in these two sets of land.  
 We used regression analysis to examine the factors influencing the tenancy decisions 
of the households and their choice of contracts. We concluded that tenancy exists when there 
is a mismatch between the cultivation potential of the assets a farm household possesses 
(many of which assets are not fully marketable) and its owned landholding. If the farm 
households own more supervision ability than its owned land and relatively lower 
management ability, it will go for sharecropping (Batai). This also explains why there has 
been a shift towards Peshgi and Chauthai contracts. The nature of development since 1983-84 
has resulted in lower per capita landholding and two classes of farm households; one with 
more management ability relative to own land and second, households with more supervision 
ability relative to own land. The former opt for Peshgi, while the latter opted for Chauthai 
contracts.  
 Finally, we looked at the tenancy model of Bliss and Stern (1982) which argued that 
imperfection in labour market and bullock ploughing market leads to tenancy in Palanpur. In 
our adaptation of the model to 2008-09 data, we found that despite important changes in 
markets for agricultural inputs, the original model’s essence that tenancy exists in order to 
remove the imperfections associated with markets other than land is supported. 
 As research agendas for the future, a first point is that a lot more can be done to 
attempt to understand better the relations between land and labour inside the village and 
outside. This paper makes it clear that land and labour interactions in the agricultural process 
are responding to changes, and in turn changing, the nature of institutions and markets. There 
is a need to study these interactions in detail in order to understand their impact and what 
they imply for the future. Keeping in view the quality of the cultivation data collected, there 
is also a great potential here for a detailed input-output analysis in agriculture.  
 Secondly, this paper does not utilise a large part of the data set collected in 2009 
Kharif.  These could help us look at the response of households to external shocks such as 
drought. Although preliminary analysis of cropping pattern suggests that such changes were 
significant, it would be interesting to analyse these changes with respect to other determinants 
of agricultural productivity. 
 Third, most of the debate in the Indian context on production conditions in Indian 
agriculture has revolved around the ‘mode of production debate’, ‘size class productivity 
debate’, ‘interlinkage of factor markets’ and finally ‘tenancy’. The ‘mode of production’ 
debate has centred on the nature of social and production relations which characterise the 
production conditions. The second debate has been on the efficiency and productivity of 
small farmers compared to large farmers, also known as the size productivity debate. The 
third crucial debate has been the debate on sharecropping and its efficiency. All the three 
debates have largely been analysed in isolation and village surveys have played an important 
role in this primarily because most of these issues requires close observation of relationship 
between various factors of production which are not easy to capture in large scale secondary 
surveys.  
 However, although various theories have been tested and alternative explanations 
provided, conclusive answers to many of the puzzles remain relevant, yet remain elusive.. An 
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important reason for the inconclusiveness of these debates lies with the great heterogeneity of 
the Indian agrarian landscape, characterised by variations in the nature of land endowments, 
agrarian practices, cropping patterns and above all historically-grounded social relations. A 
second problem was methodological, where more often than not these issues were analysed in 
isolation without an underlying integrated model of the agrarian economy in a developing 
country context. Understanding the nature of inter-linkages between the factors of production 
under imperfect market conditions is important to understanding the emergence and survival 
of institutional responses such as sharecropping. It is in this context that issues of efficiency 
and incentives need not be analysed from the perspective of static efficiency of farms but 
should be seen as a response to issues of allocative efficiency of the system given land and 
labour endowments and their distribution. A further methodological issue has been the 
analysis of production conditions in agriculture in a closed economy model. Most of the 
models and analysis have not been able to adequately factor in the role played by the non-
farm sector which has emerged as a major driver of change in the factor market for labour as 
well as land. The Palanpur survey has always provided an ideal platform to analyse some of 
these theoretical constructs. An agenda for future research would be to develop an integrated 
framework of analysis of all these dimensions in the context of recent changes, institutional 
as well as at the household level.  
 Finally, a multitude of factors have led to changes in portfolio of activities and 
incomes for village households. Some income sources have disappeared; other has declined 
in importance, while new activities and income sources have risen to prominence owing to 
development and changes within the village and nearby areas. Understanding the changes in 
income and activity portfolios of households in light of these broader forces of change will 
highlight the nature and extent of the development processes at work in the village. Also, 
given these choices and portfolios, it will be interesting to examine the attitudes to risk and 
uncertainty. Given the richness of Palanpur data and the fact that much of rural India is 
experiencing similar changes; this topic grows in both interest and importance.  
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